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Abstract—Cryptography provides techniques to cypher and de-
cypher sensitive information through a token called key in
order to store and transmit it across insecure networks. The
goal of cryptography is to protect information from potential
attackers and to enable access to authorized users only. Sev-
eral hardware cryptographic devices are entering the market.
However, these devices can be subject to passive attacks that
consist in retrieving secret data by observing the side-channel
behaviour of the device (i.e. execution time, power consump-
tion, electromagnetic field). This work studies the robustness
of SEcube
TM
, an innovative secure hardware product against
Differential Power Analysis attacks. SEcube
TM
is a system-on-
chip equipped with three devices interconnected and embedded
in a single chip: an ARM Cortex M4 low-power processor,
a Lattice MachXO2-7000 FPGA and a SmartCard SLJ52G
(EAL5+ certified). Moreover, in order to examine the security
enhancement of this platform, we perform the same analysis
with a similar board equipped with the same microprocessor
and then compare the results.
Experimental results show that the number of correct bits
is similar between the two platform.
Index Terms—Side-channel power analysis DPA
1. Introduction
C RYPTOGRAPHY provides techniques to cypher and de-cypher sensitive information through a token called key
in order to store and transmit it across insecure networks.
The goal of cryptography is to protect information from
potential attackers and to enable access to authorized users
only.
In contrast to the cryptography principles, the cryptanal-
ysis techniques are used to acquire knowledge of cyphered
information without using the de-cypher key. Cryptanaly-
sis attacks often exploit hardware and/or software physical
properties of the implementation of the cryptographic algo-
rithms (i.e. execution time, power consumption, electromag-
netic field, glitches and fault sensitivity).
Cryptanalysis attacks can be distinguished in four cat-
egories: (1) active, (2) passive, (3) invasive and (4) non-
invasive. In case of the active attacks the malicious user
acts directly on the device trying to alter its behaviour (e.g.,
injecting faults) while in passive attacks the attacker does
nothing other than to observe the normal behaviour of the
device. When the attack alters physically the device, for
example exposing access to its internal components and
connections, it is defined as invasive, instead non-invasive at-
tacks do not require physical alteration of the device because
they exploit external information, i.e., physical quantities.
Side-channel analysis is among the most effective pas-
sive and non-invasive type of attack [1]. It exploits the fact
that all cryptographic devices leak physical data during the
encryption process. The leakage (e.g., electromagnetic radia-
tion, power dissipation, etc.) can be measured, collected and
analyzed in order to discover the encryption key monitoring
the behavior of the circuit. To succeed in the attack, the
observed physical quantities must be somehow correlated
with the secret key used to cypher the information. The most
effective property of side-channel attacks is its black-box
approach that only requires the knowledge of the encryption
algorithm but not its specific implementation. Among the
physical leakages, the most easy to acquire is the power
consumption. It is sufficient to place a resistor between
the power supply line and the circuit in order to collect
measurements of the voltage required by the device.
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) belong to the category of side-channel
attacks focusing on power consumption [1]. SPA is a tech-
nique that focuses on the performed operations of a device
to acquire knowledge of information. Inspecting the leakage
traces it is possible to understand which operations are
performed, provided that the operations have different power
consumption. Also the sequence of operations might provide
useful information, when the operations performed depend
on the processed data. Instead, in DPA, the focus is on
the data itself. It considers the dependencies among power
consumption traces for different data processed. Depending
on the considered leakage model, different number of tran-
sitions lead to different power consumption values.
This work studies the robustness of SEcube
TM
, an
innovative secure hardware product, against DPA at-
tacks. SEcube
TM
is a system-on-chip. It is equipped with
three devices interconnected and embedded in a single
chip: an ARM Cortex M4 low-power processor, a Lat-
tice MachXO2-7000 FPGA and a SmartCard SLJ52G
(EAL5+ certified). The platform is available either as
SEcube
TM
Development Board for development purposes or
as USB stick (USEcube
TM
) to be employed as security
token. In both cases, the interface adopted between the
SEcube
TM
device and the host system is the USB bus.
While the board is commonly used for development, the
USB token can be used in a variety of fields and applications
(e.g., home banking) where security cannot be neglected.
For this reason, the purpose of this paper is to analyze
the robustness of the SEcube
TM
device. Moreover, in order
to examine the security enhancement of this platform, we
perform the same analysis with a similar board equipped
with the same microprocessor and then compare the results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 supplies
a short overview regarding the Differential Power Analysis
technique. Section 3 explains the tools and the methodology
adopted to carry out the experiment. Section 4 reports and
discusses the obtained results. Finally, Section 5 concludes
this paper.
2. Differential Power Analysis
Differential Power Analysis is a side-channel attack
which considers the power consumption of a circuit. It is
a non-invasive attack that requires physical access to the
security device. More precisely it must be possible to act on
the device supply line. This technique can be employed to
identify the key used for the encryption. It can be helpful to
identify just a part of the key when this technique is adopted
together with a brute-force attack. This can be simplified
avoiding unnecessary combinations already assessed with
DPA leading to a faster attack.
The basic idea of the DPA is to find a correlation
among different sets of data to be processed with a crypto-
graphic algorithm through a statistical analysis of the power
consumption values [2]. It exploits the fact that, different
data will lead to a different power consumption when the
operations performed are the same.
First, several sets of power consumption measurements
have to be collected avoiding as much as possible noise
that will impact negatively the analysis leading to incorrect
results. Second, the DPA takes place: all collected power
measurements are partitioned in two different sets according
to a selection function and with an assumption on the value
of a bit belonging to the key. The difference of the average
of power traces in each group is computed. This is repeated
for every bit of the key.
The selection function determines how to group power
traces. It depends on the power consumption model. Several
models are possible, in this paper we consider only the
following:
• Hamming Distance - one set contains the traces that
are considered to generate the transition of the bit
value 0 to 1 and 1 to 0. The other set contains the
remaining traces;
• Hamming Weight - one set contains the traces that
are considered to generate the transition of the bit
value 0 to 1 and 1 to 1. The other set contains the
remaining traces;
• Rising - one set contains the traces that are consid-
ered to generate the transition of the bit value 0 to
1. The other set contains the remaining traces;
By construction, one of the two sets will contain a
power consumption component not present in the other set.
The difference of the averages will approach zero for an
increasing number of traces when there is no correlation,
while it will present a peak in the opposite case. It has
to be noted that even in presence of noise affecting the
measurements, given enough traces it can be possible to
detect small correlations [2]. The choice of the selection
function will change the components of the two sets, and as
consequence also the averages change. In general, this will
lead to different results in term of correct bits.
3. Setup
The security device we use in our experiments is the
SEcube
TM
platform. It is an open-source security platform
which provides both hardware schematic and software
source code. Even though the SEcube
TM
platform is provided
with its open-source firmware and the implementation of
its cryptographic algorithms is known, in order to better
analyze the strength of its security, we decided to employ
a black-box approach based on the sampling of the power
consumption. Also, we want to compare the efficacy of the
DPA attack with a normal device, to verify the security im-
provement brought by SEcube
TM
comparing it with a similar
device. To make the experiment meaningful, we picked a
ST Microelectronics Nucleo board [3] equipped with the
same microprocessor [4] of SEcube
TM
. All these devices
are powered through the USB interface, where we act to
precisely measure the power consumption.
The commercial USB token USEcube
TM
does not allow
direct access to the internal circuitry. This already partially
prevents the usage of probes to capture the power supply
signal, unless invasive attacks are employed. For our experi-
ments we adopted the Development Board version. With this
device, having direct access to the Vdd pins, we could sample
the power consumption very easily and with low noise. Nev-
ertheless, to emulate a real attack, for both Nucleo board and
SEcube
TM
board, we decided to use a custom connector to
sample the power signal from the power supply line between
the platform and the host PC. This special custom device
is tailored for a generic USB device, so it can be employed
also for other types of devices. To build it, we used an
electronic prototyping board (i.e., a stripboard), where an
USB male socket and a USB female connector have been
soldered and linked together. The connection between the
two ports is voluntarily left exposed, allowing the probes to
be attached easily without introducing distortion. Moreover,
a BNC connector is inserted in parallel between the supply
line (+5V) and ground line (GND) (see Figure 1). In this
way, this device can be connected directly to an oscilloscope
avoiding the noise introduced by probes ohmic contacts,
Figure 1. Custom handmade USB-USB/BNC connector
thus leading to more accurate measurements of the input
voltage. Also, it allows us to perform the attack without
physically modifying the security device, hence maintaining
a non-invasive approach. To perform measurements, we
employed an oscilloscope. The used device is a Tektronix
TDS5052B [5] with 500 MHz bandwidth, 5 GS/s real-time
sample rate and 2 acquisition channels. It embeds a General
Purpose Interface Bus (GPIB) controller, which we use to
manage the measurement process. In order to collect and
store the power traces in an automated way, we setup a
LabView module, which interfaces with and command the
oscilloscope through the GPIB interface. Also the data is
collected through the same physical interface.
Another requirement to perform a DPA attack is to know
what algorithm is involved. Being the SEcube
TM
firmware
open-source we can see that the available encryption algo-
rithm is the AES-256 implemented using a software routine.
To verify the security solely of the hardware platform
we created a custom firmware. This firmware includes low-
level drivers for the microprocessor but it only executes the
encryption algorithm instead of the whole SEcube
TM
open-
source firmware. By employing this new firmware, we can
better isolate the encryption process, which lead us to more
accurate measurements without spurious transitions due to
other operations performed in the original firmware that
are not directly related to the encryption. The implemented
AES algorithm is coded in C language, like the rest of the
firmware. The implementation uses the simplest operation
mode, i.e., Electronic Codebook (ECB). Both the used plain-
text and the encryption key have size equal to 128 bits and
are hard-coded in the firmware. The encryption process is
repeated multiple times: it ciphers the plaintext with the
same key, but in every round the last byte of the plaintext is
changed, in order to have data dependence. The voltage drop
at the power supply pins is measured during this process.
To simplify the data trace acquisition procedure we added
a trigger signal to highlight the beginning of the encryption
process.
Finally, the acquired tracks are parsed and edited to be
compliant with the software for the DPA analysis realized
TABLE 1. CIPHER KEY OF 128 BIT FROM [7] - CASE A
0x2b 0x7e 0x15 0x16 0x28 0xae 0xd2 0xa6
0xab 0xf7 0x15 0x88 0x09 0xcf 0x4f 0x3c
TABLE 2. PLAINTEXT OF 128 BIT FROM [7] - CASE A
0x32 0x43 0xf6 0xa8 0x88 0x5a 0x30 0x8d
0x31 0x31 0x98 0xa2 0xe0 0x37 0x07 0x00 .. 0xFF
by the authors of [6].
Figure 2 shows the whole workflow just described.
4. Results
In order to test the security improvement introduced by
SEcube
TM
platform, we adopted a comparative method. We
take as a reference design the Nucleo board which embeds
the same microprocessor of the SEcube
TM
. The AES en-
cryption algorithm is executed on both development boards
against the same input data. The power traces are sampled
with the same experimental setup. The attacks are performed
separately and the results are compared. The difference in
terms of effort (number of power traces required, number
of guessed bits, ...) gives a quantitative estimation of the
security enhancement of the SEcube
TM
platform with respect
to the Nucleo board.
The test-bench algorithm is a software implementation
of the AES algorithm. We adopt the same key and the same
plaintext (both of 128 bits) proposed in the NIST standard
specifications presented in FIPS PUB 197 [7]. However in
our experiments, we limit the attack to the last byte of the
key. The key and the plaintext used are reported respectively
in Table 1 and Table 2.
The encryption process consists into cypher the block of
data with the specified key. This is repeated 256 times and
in every cycle we vary the plaintext altering the last byte
for every possible configuration, from 0x00 to 0xFF. We
control and force the changes into the plaintext in order to
generate on purpose data-correlation among the sets of mea-
surements. The encryption process is then repeated a modest
number of times, in order to have statistical relevance.
The measurements acquired with the oscilloscope
amount to 2.713 traces for Nucleo Board and to 15.872 for
SEcube
TM
. The traces are collected during the encryption
routine. We decided to acquire more measurements on the
SEcube
TM
platform since it should be more secure. In total,
the encryption sessions are 16 for the Nucleo board, against
62 for SEcube
TM
. Every power consumption trace contains
10.000 samples.
The robustness of the SEcube
TM
platform against side-
channel analysis has been verified through a real
DPA attack experience. Both configurations, Nucleo and
SEcube
TM
Development Board, while encrypting test data are
analyzed in order to collect the power consumption traces.
To relax the time required for running the data acquisition,
the attack was limited to a specific byte, thus only 256 traces
in every encryption session.
Figure 2. Overview of the workflow adopted
TABLE 3. NUCLEO RESULTS - WRONG BITS IN THE KEY
Nucleo
No. of Samples 2500 3333 5000 10000
SboxAES
Hamming Distance 4 2 2 3
Hamming Weight 5 3 5 6
Rising 3 4 4 3
Average 4 3 4 4
AES
Hamming Distance 4 2 5 3
Hamming Weight 5 3 5 6
Rising 6 4 6 5
Average 5 3 5 5
After the acquisition phase, the traces are preprocessed,
parsed and fed to the DPA tool. The analysis has been car-
ried out considering variations on the following parameters:
• Number of samples of each trace: we considered
25%, 30%, 50% and 100% with respect to the full
number of samples.
• Type of the Algorithm: we considered the whole
AES encryption algorithm and the single S-Box
(SboxAES).
• Selection Function: Hamming weight (hweight),
Hamming distance (hdistance), Rising
Table 3 and Table 4 present the results from the anal-
ysis. Each columns represent the number of samples in
every trace. On the rows there are the selection functions
considered. Moreover, the results are divided considering
whole AES encryption and the single S-Box. The results
presented in the various configurations of the parameters
state the number of incorrect bits in the last byte of the
encryption key. The average of incorrect bits is rounded up
and is computed considering the previous configurations.
An higher number of bits indicates an unsuccessful attack,
which can be interpreted as an enhancement in security.
The reference configuration was attacked first. The re-
sults are reported in Table 3. It can be noticed that attacking
only the Sbox of the AES the results are slightly better.
However, in most cases, just half of last byte of the key is
correct. Considering the whole AES, the number of wrong
bits increases.
TABLE 4. SECUBE RESULTS - WRONG BITS IN THE KEY
SEcube
No. of Samples 2500 3333 5000 10000
SboxAES
Hamming Distance 4 3 4 4
Hamming Weight 6 4 3 4
Rising 1 2 1 5
Average 4 3 3 4
AES
Hamming Distance 5 5 5 5
Hamming Weight 6 4 3 4
Rising 5 4 3 2
Average 5 4 4 4
The same attack is performed on the
SEcube
TM
configuration. The results of the analysis are
shown in Table 4. Also considering the SEcube
TM
platform
the results are similar. The same considerations applies
also.
5. Conclusions
From the results of our analysis it can be seen that on
average both platforms provide the same level of security.
We can state that after analysing several power consumption
traces we were able to discover roughly only half byte of
the whole key. This result might lead to improvements when
DPA is combined with a brute-force attack. Although the
results are similar, in this paper several simplifications are
considered. It must be pointed out that the number of traces
acquired for the SEcube
TM
platform is much higher than the
one acquired for the Nucleo board. Further investigation is
required to achieve more significant results.
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